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Abstract
In this paper, we use concepts from the Actor-
Network theory (ANT) to interpret the sequence of events
that led to BPR failure at TELECO, a large
telecommunications company in the US. Through our
intensive examination of the BPR initiative at TELECO,
we find that a number of factors suggested by the ANT
perspective such as errors in problematization, parallel
translation, betrayal, and irreversible inscription of
interests (that later became irrelevant) contributed
significantly to the failure. The larger implication of our
study is that, for sociotechnical phenomena with
significant political component (such as most BPR
initiatives), ANT can provide a complementary set of
concepts that allow for a richer understanding of
complexities involved, and thereby help management
make better diagnosis and interventions.
Introduction
Business Process Reengineering (BPR) has gained
significant popularity among practitioners since the early
1990s; however, the promises of BPR have not always
been realized, and about 50% BPR initiatives are believed
to have failed (Hammer, 1995). Political processes have
been viewed as one of the potentially critical causes for
many of these failures; yet, the BPR literature, and
subsequently ERP literature (in which BPR concepts have
been appropriated), has remained largely "atheoretical"
(Guha et al.,  1997) with no serious theoretical approach
being applied to understand why and how political
processes contribute to failure, and how to manage these
processes. This paper presents a preliminary interpretation
of a real case study of BPR failure using the concepts of
Actor-Network theory (ANT), a perspective, which
provides a useful analytical framework for studying
political processes within a sociotechnical context. The
paper has two objectives: first, it presents a new
theoretical perspective, and illustrates some of the
concepts associated with the perspective using data from
an actual case study; and second, it suggests some
implications/insights that are not readily apparent through
atheoretical common-sense interpretation that
characterizes much of the BPR literature.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section,
a brief overview of ANT concepts used in this analysis is
provided. A summary of the methodology and the case
narrative is presented in the second section. The third
section offers a re-interpretation of the case study from
the ANT perspective, with the  implications presented in
the final section.
Actor-Network Theory: An Overview of
Some Important Concepts
Actor network theory (ANT), first proposed by Michel
Callon and Bruno Latour in the early 1980s (Callon and
Latour, 1981; Callon, 1986), and later extended and
enriched by the original authors and other researchers,
provides a novel sociotechnical approach for
understanding the creation of networks of aligned
interests. In one of the earliest works on actor-network
theory, Callon and Latour (1981) outline how micro-
actors (individuals) form alliances and enroll other actors,
and use artifacts to strengthen such alliances and to secure
their interests, thus creating networks made of humans
and artifacts.  Interestingly, these networks have been
found to themselves act as if they were independent
autonomous actors; hence these networks are referred to
as "actor-networks." In the field of Information Systems,
ANT has been recognized as having immense potential
for understanding the complex social interactions
associated with IT (Walsham, 1997), and has specifically
been used to interpret the political process of systems
implementation (e.g., Walsham and Sahay, 1999).
While ANT is based on a large number of concepts,
we will introduce only a subset of these concepts in this
paper that we find most pertinent to the analysis of the
case study. We summarize our discussion of the concepts
in Table 1.
Actor, which may be human or non-human, is one of
the central constructs of the actor-network theory. Callon
and Latour describe it as “any element which bends space
around itself, makes other elements dependent upon itself
and translate their will into the language of its own”
(Callon and Latour, 1981, p.286). Common examples of
actors include humans, collectivities of humans, texts,
graphical representations, and technical artifacts. Actors,
all of which have interests, try to convince other actors so
as to create an alignment of the other actors' interests with
their own interests. This process of convincing, when
effective, results in the creation of an actor-network -- a
heterogeneous network of aligned interests.
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The creation of an actor-network, also referred to as
translation, is described by Callon (1986). This process
consists of three major stages: problematization,
interessement, and enrolment.  The process of translation
is meaningful when viewed from the perspective of a
chosen actor. In other words, if we assume that there are a
number of actors in an organization, each of the different
actors may be involved in different processes of
translation, which are likely to have different
characteristics and outcomes. It is necessary, for the
purpose of clarity, to pick a focal actor, from whose
vantage point we wish to see the process of translation.
Problematization is the first moment of translation
during which a focal actor defines identities and interests
of other actors that are consistent with its1 own interests,
and establishes itself as an obligatory passage point
(OPP), thus “rendering itself indispensable”(Callon, 1986,
p.204).  Broadly, OPP refers to a situation or process that
has to occur in order for all the actors to satisfy their
interests that have been attributed to them by the focal
actor. It is useful to note that while OPP lies in the direct
path of the focal actor, other actors have to overcome
some obstacles in order to pass through the OPP.
The second moment of translation is referred to as
interessement, and this involves convincing other actors
that the interests defined by the focal actor are in fact their
(the other actors') interests, and creating incentives for
actors such that they are willing to overcome obstacles in
the way of passing through the OPP.  If interessement is
successful, the enrollment occurs. Enrollment involves a
definition of roles of each of the actors in the newly
created actor-network.
While the process of translation often involves
negotiations among the actors, actors do not always
participate in such negotiations themselves. In many cases
they send speakers or representatives, or else
speakers/representatives choose to speak on behalf of
actors.  For example, a computer engineer can speak on
behalf of computers, and a user representative on a
steering committee can speak on behalf of all the users.  It
does not mean, however, that actors will always abide by
the agreements (translations) achieved by their
representatives. In many cases, actors betray their
representatives: a computer does not work according to
what the engineer predicted, and users do not accept
technology which was deemed acceptable by their
representative.  This phenomenon is referred to as
betrayal.
The process of inscription is critical to building
networks, because once an agreement between actors is
achieved, it needs to be committed to the shared memory
of the social system (i.e., "stabilized"). Strategies for
                                                          
1
 Noting that an actor may be human or non-human, we use "it"
rather than "it/him/her" for the sake of convenience.
inscription (in the context of computing) include creation
of texts (e.g. software manual), or technical artifacts (e.g.
password protection on the e-mail account).  Most
artifacts within a social system are inscriptions of some
interests, and they prescribe a program of action for other
actors, which the latter may or may not follow. The
process of inscription and associated processes of
prescription, subscription, description, etc., are described
in great detail in the ANT literature (e.g., Latour, 1992).
Irreversibility is an important concept, which concerns
the stability of translations, that is the possibility that
translations can change over time. Irreversibility refers to
the degree to which it is subsequently impossible to go
back to a point where alternative possibilities exist.
Irreversibility is often achieved by inscribing interests
into technological artifacts, and by enrolling a large
number of actors into a network. The concepts discussed
are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Definitions of some central concepts of ANT
Concepts Definition
Actor “Any element which bends space around itself,
makes other element dependent upon itself and
translates their will into the language of its own”
(Callon and Latour, 1981).
Actor-network “Heterogeneous network of aligned interests”
(Callon and Latour, 1981).
Problematization The first moment of translation during which a
focal actor defines identities and interests of other
actors that are consistent with its own interests,
and establishes itself as an obligatory passage
point (OPP), thus rendering itself indispensable
(Callon, 1986).
Obligatory
Passage Point
A situation that has to occur for all of the actors
to be able to achieve their interests, as defined by
the focal actor (Callon, 1986).
Interessement A process of convincing actors to accept
definition of the focal actor (Callon, 1986).
Enrollment A situation when actors accept interests defined
for them by the focal actor (Callon, 1986).
Inscription A process of creation of technical artifacts that
would ensure the protection of certain interests
(Latour, 1992).
Speaker/Represe
ntative
An actor that speaks on behalf of other actors
(Callon, 1986).
Betrayal A situation when actors do not abide by the
agreements (translations) achieved by their
representatives (Callon, 1986).
Irreversibility Degree to which it is subsequently impossible to
return to a point where alternative possibilities
exist (Walsham, 1997)
The Case Study
Methodology
We used the interpretive case study methodology
(Walsham, 1995) to guide the collection and analysis of
data. Adopting a social constructivist perspective, we
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used the concepts for ANT for developing the theoretical
sensitivity that would allow us to view the large volumes
of data in a certain manner, and make sense of it.  Data
collection included obtaining documentary evidence such
as letters, memos, reports, and e-mail, and conducting
multiple structured as well as unstructured interviews
with 6 organizational members at different levels and
departments who had participated in (or had been affected
by) the BPR initiative to different extents. The interviews
were conducted in great depth, and typically lasted
between one and two hours. All interviews were fully
taped and transcribed.
A brief narrative of the case
TELECO is an independent telecommunications
company based in a prominent city in the Midwest region
of the US, employing approximately 3500 employees. In
early 1993, in response to the growing concerns regarding
inevitable changes in the organization’s external
environment wherein TELECO would be forced to
compete with utilities, cable companies and long-distance
carriers for a large portion of its business, the President of
the company, along with the VPs, initiated a
reengineering initiative by hiring a reputed consulting
firm, and then assembling a reengineering team consisting
of 25 members from different parts of TELECO.
The reengineering team studied the organization for
several months and came up with an elaborate redesign.
The redesign, developed using computerized tools such as
Visio and Microsoft Project, consisted of process maps
(before and after) along with detailed descriptions, human
resource specifications, technology specifications, and
detailed schedules for employee layoffs and IT
implementation.
The implementation was a disaster with employees
being laid off even before the information systems that
were to substitute the employees were actually
implemented. In addition the attractive "retirement
package" negotiated by the union and management to
gain the support of employees for BPR, prompted many
employees to take voluntary retirement, and join a
competing company. During this time, the customer
service suffered, and TELECO almost went out of
business. For further details regarding the TELECO BPR
initiative, please see Sarker and Lee (1999).
An Interpretation of TELECO's BPR
Initiative Using the ANT Perspective
Creation of the network
 In this section, we describe the BPR initiative at
TELECO as a process of creation, maintenance, and
gradual expansion of actor-networks. The need for BPR
was initially proposed by TELECO's top management;
therefore, we will start our analysis with identification of
the top management as the focal actor. We will assume
that improvement of the competitive position of the
company to ensure its financial viability is the major
interest pursued by the focal actor.  Here it is important to
differentiate the interest of the top management
(comprised of senior executives) as a collective actor
(referred to as “top management”) from the interests of
individual senior executives (referred to as “senior
executives”), and we will refer to this difference later in
this section.  We now trace the stages of actor-network
creation (Callon, 1986) in the context of BPR at
TELECO.
Problematization-- Identification of Actors: From the
point of view of the top management (the focal actor), the
following actors' interests had to be aligned to their (i.e.
top management’s) interests: consulting team, employees,
re-engineering team, information technology, BPR tools,
IT team, and the union. Interests, as defined by the top
management for some key actors, are presented in Table
2. Interestingly, the top management did not recognize
senior executives as a separate actor; it assumed that
interests of senior executives were already aligned with
those of top management. While such alignment of
interests existed before BPR initiation, it was disturbed
due to dynamically changing interests once BPR started at
TELECO.
Another interesting aspect of this situation is that one
of the actors, the re-engineering team, was in fact created
in order to enable BPR, and to reinforce the network.
This is the process similar to the inscription process
described by Latour (1992), only the interests were
inscribed not in a technical artifact, but into a social body.
Thus, by the nature of its creation, the interests of the re-
engineering team were aligned with the interests of the
top management. However, once other actors, such as
employees and the top management accepted the role of
the re-engineering team (similar to the dissemination of
technology), the re-engineering team gained properties of
irreversibility and became an actor able and willing to
define and change environment around it.
Problematization -- Determination of the OPP: BPR
was defined as the OPP for this network. If employees
wanted to retain their long-term financial well-being, if
the consultants wanted to receive monetary reward and
maintain their reputation, if the re-engineering team
wanted to be able to gain valuable experience and to
receive recognition, if the IT team wanted to improve its
effectiveness in managing technology, if the BPR tools
wanted to maintain their reputation of being useful, and if
process-enabling technology wanted to be employed at
TELECO in the future, they all had to cooperate in the
BPR process.  To cooperate, each actor had to deviate
from its direct path in order to overcome "obstacles." For
example, employees had to subject themselves to the
uncertainties of BPR, and the reengineering team had to
put in many extra hours to learn unknown methodologies
and tools. Also, re-engineering team members had to
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alienate many former friends and colleagues whose jobs
they had to eliminate as a part of BPR.
Interessement. After determination of the OPP, the
top management faced the task of convincing such actors
as employees, consultants, re-engineering team, IT team,
BPR tools, and current IT to agree to the interests defined
for them by the top management, to deviate from their
direct path and to pass through the OPP, defined as BPR.
Table 2 summarizes obstacles that needed to be overcome
by some of the actors and interessement mechanisms used
by the top management in order to convince each of the
actors to go through the OPP. It is necessary to note that
senior executives were not recognized as an actor by the
top management, and were thus excluded at the
interessement stage.
Inscription and creation of new actors. In the process
of creation of the actor-network, a number of texts and
graphical representations were created that had the
interests of the top management inscribed in them. Once
approved by the top management and circulated among
employees, these texts and technical artifacts gained
properties of irreversibility. One example of such text is
the lay-off schedule that was created at the stage of BPR
planning, and that was not revised even after it was
obvious that the assumptions made during the creation of
the plans/schedule were no longer valid.
Enrollment. Did the top management achieve
enrollment of the actors? In order to answer this question,
we note that the main interest behind the BPR network
was the improvement of the TELECO’s effectiveness and
competitive position through the implementation of
streamlined business processes and by enabling cross-
functional coordination in the organization. BPR failed to
achieve these results. Thus, the top management was
unsuccessful in creation of a network to achieve its
primary interest.
Failure of BPR: Implications of the analysis
using the ANT perspective.
In this section, we consider some of the factors that
prevented the top management from achievement of
successful enrollment. These factors fall into four broad
categories: errors at the problematization stage, existence
of parallel translation processes, betrayal of
representatives by the actors they represent, and
irreversible inscription of interests that had become
irrelevant.
Errors at the problematization stage: At the
problematization stage, the top management failed to
recognize the existence and significance of an important
actor – senior executives, assuming that senior executives'
interests coincided with those of top management.
Because of this, senior executives were excluded from the
interessement process, and no effort was made to align
their interests with those of the top management. This led
to senior-executives defining not only their own interests,
but also interests of other actors, including re-engineering
team. For example, the redesigns presented by the
reengineering team were not approved if any of the senior
executives were likely to be displaced due to the
implementation of the redesign.
Table 2. Sample Actors, their interests as defined by the
top management, along with obstacles and interessement
mechanisms used
Actor Interests
defined by the
BPR Initiator
Obstacles on
the way to the
OPP
Interessemen
t mechanisms
used
Top
management
To improve
effectiveness of
the company
None
Consultants To receive
monetary
reward and a
good
recommendatio
n from a client.
To “fit” known
methodologies
to the client’s
situation
Monetary
rewards and
the assurance
of full
cooperation
and top
management
backing
during the
BPR process.
Senior
executives*
Not defined..  BPR threatens
job security of
senior
executives by
eliminating
functions and
processes.
None
Employees To achieve
professional
success in the
long-run.
To work for a
successful
company.
To improve
their
effectiveness.
BPR threatens
job security due
to the re-
definition of
roles.
BPR requires
employees to
learn new skills
and to adjust to
new processes.
Creation of an
early
retirement
plan.
Union To represent
employees’
interests.
Short-term
employees’
interests are not
taken into
account in the
BPR.
Negotiation
with the
Union and
attempts to
convince it
that
employee’s
interests are
taken into
consideration.
Re-
engineering
team
To design
effective
processes
Pressures from
other actors that
try to define
identity of the
re-engineering
team.
Isolating re-
engineering
team from
other actors,
such as
employees.
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Parallel Translation Processes. As noted by Callon,
translation can be considered only from a perspective of a
particular actor, since multiple translation processes are
going on simultaneously. A number of these translation
attempts by different actors were incompatible with each
other; as a result, the enrollments desired by different
actors were not achieved. The fact that senior executives
had interests that were different from those of the top
management led the senior executives to initiate their own
translation process.  During this process senior executives
used interessement mechanism of not approving redesigns
proposed by reengineering team that were not compatible
with their personal interests, although compatible with
interests of the top management.
Betrayal: This occurs when actors do not act in
accordance with the agreement achieved on their behalf
by their representatives, and it may lead to a failure of a
translation process (Callon, 1986). In order to analyze
betrayal in the TELECO BPR case, we first need to
identify who represents whom. Two instances of such
representation are of interest to us: BPR tools with
reengineering team members as their representatives, and
employees with union as their representative. BPR tools
were first enrolled to facilitate the BPR process, and the
agreement of BPR tools to perform this role was
expressed by the reengineering team. In the course of use
of the BPR tools, it became clear that BPR tools had an
interest that was different from the one of facilitating BPR
process by supporting the reengineering team's effort.
Unexpectedly, the tools' interests came to appear as
imposing structure and requiring the creation of
"professional documentation" such that the redesigners
viewed themselves as being "slaves" of the tools.
Another instance of betrayal is associated with the
representation of the employee’s interests by the Union.
When trying to enroll employees, top management
negotiated conditions of such enrollment. According to
the agreement achieved between the top management and
employees, as represented by the union, employees were
expected to support the BPR process if their financial
security was guaranteed. However, employees betrayed
their representative (the Union), and refused to support
BPR initiative by opportunistically taking advantage of
early retirement and leaving the company.
Irreversible inscription of interests that later became
irrelevant.  A significant problem in the BPR arose from
the irreversibility of artifacts created by the reengineering
team. As mentioned earlier, the layoff schedule for
employees were developed with the assumption that the
enabling technologies would be implemented by that
time. Yet, when the layoff dates arrived, the Human
Resources department was held accountable to follow the
“retirement” schedule, even though it was obvious that
without the new technology (which was not expected to
be completed for several months), the depleted set of
employees would not be able to run operations. Ironically,
the employees who were laid off in accordance with the
inscriptions, either joined the competition after receiving
an attractive retirement package, or they were hired back
at twice their pre-retirement wages after being paid all the
retirement benefits.
Conclusion
Like any IT enabled organizational transformation
initiative, a BPR project can be studied using a number of
theoretical perspectives, including technological or
organizational determinism, social construction of
technology perspective, etc.. As argued by Lea et al.
(1995), ATN provides a complementary view on IT-
enabled organizational change treating it as a reflexive
process, in which both technology and social groups
mutually construct each other.  Also, deep IT-enabled
organizational changes (that are associated with most
BPR initiatives) are best studied using political power
models (Cooper and Zmud, 1990), and ANT is well suited
for studying political processes due to its attention to
conflicting interests. Therefore, while the analysis
presented in this paper is preliminary, we do believe that
it is helpful in establishing that the theory used (ANT) can
sensitize us to understand the process of BPR in an
alternate way. This theoretical sensitivity, we feel, can
help help practitioners diagnose or avoid potential
political pitfalls arising from the lack of alignment in the
social networks.
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